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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to explore the use
of rationality in corporate bureaucratic administra
tion, and the notion of a movement from fealty to con
tract, or more specifically, a shift from relations
based on personality to those based on secondary,
contractual relationships. It was posited that move
ment from fealty to contract is associated with a
move from relatively nonrational to rational admin
istration.
A case study was executed using a financially
failing firm which had recently been acquired by a
conglomerate corporation. The object was to identify
the existence of certain nonrational practices prior
to acquisition with a view toward examining their
effect on the organization and to see what changes
had occurred in these practices after succession.
As dimensions of analysis, certain policies
and rules were selected for their apparent relation
ship with rational practice and the maximization of
organizational goals. The status of professional
ization among the firings engineers was also examined
to determine if the contractual setting was conducive
to professionalization, a phenomenon which is seen by
sociologists as associated with contract* Further,
certain traditional fealty-based practices, present
before acquisition, were explored in the post-acquisi
tion setting.
Findings suggest that a shift from nonrational
to rational corporate administration is associated
with the movement from fealty to contract, and that
rational practices act in service to organizational
goals. Data also indicate that the contractual set
ting is conducive to professionalization, and that
fealty-based practices do not appear viable in a
rational bureaucratic setting.

RATIONALITY IN CONGLOMERATE SUCCESSIONi
A CASE STUDY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The basis for current theories and research per
taining to bureaucracy was established by Max Weber in
The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*
1957)

(Weber,

Although Weber's construct deals with a total

system for coordinating the social and economic acti
vities of men, it is the purpose of this thesis to
focus on his idea that bureaucracy is the purest type
of rational-legal authority.

Implicit in Weber's

work was a contention that bureaucratic structure and
practice functioned in service to organizational goals
by virtue of being rationally based.
As a result of subsequent research it has become
apparent that Weber's construct was indeed an ideal
type and did not necessarily reflect the reality of
true bureaucratic operation.

Several investigators

have commented on the relationship between rationality
and bureaucracy.

Udy, in a study using 150 formal

organizations in 150 non-industrialized societies,
operationalized seven of Weber's characteristics of
bureaucracy in order to ascertain the degree of asso
ciation between those elements which he termed bureau2

3
cratic (associated with all bureaucracies) and those
which he termed rational (associated with the ration
al-legal type.)

(Udy, 1959s

791-795)

Using Yule’s

coefficient of association, Udy found that (1) bureau
cratic elements are positively associated! (2) rational
elements are positively associated, but that the gene
ral pattern of association between the two is negative.
These results are interesting, but one must bear in
mind that Udy required only three hierarchical levels
to qualify an organization as having a hierarchical
authority structure, and since one of the accepted
indexes of bureaucratization is the degree of hierarchicalization (Blau, 1956*
1970j

19) (Grusky and Miller,

445) the organisations in Udy•s sample may not

have been highly bureaucratized.

Further, the socie

ties in question were not industrialized and, therefore,
would not be expected to reflect the degree of rational
bureaucratic behavior exhibited in complex, industrial
societies.
Other investigators who have addressed themselves
to the connection between rationality and bureaucracy
are Selznick, Merton, and Stinchcombe.

Selznick has

shown, for example, how the delegation of authority can
foster the development of subunit goals which work at
.cross-purpose to the control goals of the organization,
and eventually prevent further growth.
1949)

(Selznick,

Merton pointed out that standard operating pro-

k
ce&ures can become functionally autonomous and inde
pendent of the demands placed upon the organisation,
and that impersonal reward systems can overlook indi
vidual achievements.

(Merton, 19403 560-568) Stinch-

combe has also suggested that rational organisations
and bureaucratic organizations are entirely different
things.

(Stinchcombe, 1959!

16?-18?)

Many sociologists and laymen writing primarily
in the decades of the fifties and sixties also de
scribed deviations from Weber's model.

(Whyte, 19561

Hiesman, 19501 Mills, 1951? Presthus, 1962)

For

example, Weber described bureaucratic participants
as "personally free and subject to authority only with
respect to their impersonal official obligations."
(Weber, 1957s

24)

Weber was saying in essence that

each office in an ideal bureaucratic hierarchy is filled
by a free contractual relationship, and that the organi
zation is only concerned with the individual as regards
the position for which he is hired.

William H. Whyte,

Jr., found evidence to support the tenet that the organi
zation "wants the whole man, not just part of him,"
(Whyte, 19561

191)

Among other indicators to support

such a statement, Whyte focused on the types of tests
administered to prospective employees by corporate
bureaucracies and discovered that such tests contained
indexes of loyslty and conformity.

Therefore, the test-

5
lug procedure went beyond standard aptitude testing,
which Whyte perceived as measurable to the practice of
personality testing which he saw as being unmeasurable
and irrelevant.

On this point Whyte stated further that,

"Neither in the questions nor in the evaluation of them
are the tests neutralj they are loaded with values, or
ganization values, and the result is a set of yardsticks
that reward the conformist, the pedestrian, the unimag
inative - at the expense of the exceptional individual."
(Whyte, 1956*

201)

The "organization man" literature focused on prac
tices in which the organization’s interest in the indi
vidual exceeded the bounds of his official capacity.
These included the kinds of clubs and organizations he
must join, the kind of neighborhood he must live in, his
"mode of dress, and even the functional relevance of his
wife*

"Management has a challenge and an obligation

to plan deliberately and to create a favorable, con
structive attitude on the part of the wife that will
liberate her husband’s total energies for the job."
(Whyte, 1951*

86)

Whyte stated further that, "Most

corporations keep tabs on the wife’s growth as an in
dex to the executive’s availability for certain posi
tions*"
Corporate interest in the prospective employee’s
personality and aspects of his personal life are also
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at odds with another of Weber's propositions which
states, in essence, that candidates for employment are
selected on the basis of technical competence.

This

is generally accomplished by examination or guaran
teed by diplomas certifying technical training, or
both.

One obvious deviation from this proposition

observed in the firm under study was the practice of
appointments based on nepotism in the absence of tech
nical qualifications.

Thus sociologists have noted

the substitution of personal criteria for objective
judgments of work.
The term contract noted above derives from an
idea set forth by Henry S. Maine in the last century,
and refers to an agreement between individuals which
specifies the rights and obligations (and their limit
ations) of each party to the other.
297-98)

(Maine, 1885s

As regards participation in a bureaucracy,

contract is, in essence, an agreement governed by
secondary relations in which a service is rendered
for some form of compensation.

Weber's construct

elaborates in detail Maine's idea of contract.
M. G. Vanfossen contends that bureaucracy speci
fically and social organization generally has, in
fact, been moving from "fealty to contract in con
temporary society."

The idea of fealty here refers

to a sense of personalized loyalty, obligation and
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commitment which was in evidence under the feudal sys
tem, and which Vanfossen sees as related to the kinds
of relationships between individuals and organizations
described by Whyte and others.
The general trend described by Vanfossen has also
been noted by George E. Berkley in association with his
perception of the demise of "organization man.*' (Berkley,
1971*

66-90)

Berkley cites several factors which he

believes have contributed to that demise.

The first is

the emergence of the welfare state, which he feels curbs
the power of the organization to control its members to
the extent described by -Whyte and others.

This is a

consequence of high employment rates and rising employ
ees* benefits, which in effect make the individual less
dependent on a single organization.

Berkley also cites

the growth of unionism as a factor, since unions encour
age corporations to deal with employees on the basis of
Job performance and not individual personality traits.
He also goes on to single out the growth of public cor
porations as contributing to the trend.

Berkley contends

that corporations whose stock is publicly owned and
traded cannot as easily engage in "arbitrary and capri
cious" behavior as can firms which are single propriet
orships, since such behavior might produce attacks on
management by certain stockholders.
Berkley further believes that the vanguard of the
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trend has been the growth of knowledge industries,
which contributed one-third of the gross national
product of the United States in 1965.

One outgrowth

of this factor has been an increase in innovation.
As the rate of change continues to accel
erate, organizational conformity becomes
less of a help and more of a hindrance to
organizational growth or even organization
al survival, The mounting need for innova
tion is bringing many changes to organiza
tional life. It places priority on men
and women who can think for themselves and
frowns on those who slavishly seek to imi
tate their peers and supervisors. It re
quires organizations to blink at or even
welcome human eccentricities when such
features are part of a human being’s pack
age of potentialities. (Berkley, 1971s
69-70)
Another factor which Berkley feels is germane to the
trend is specialization born of technology.

He notes

that authority is coming increasingly to rest on ex
pertise, and that expertise is becoming more widely
distributed.
Attendant to the growth of specialization, Berkley
also cites the increase in professionalization as a
contributing factor to the trend, and he quotes several
sources which maintain in essence that •'professional
men do not make good organizational men,** since they
manifest a primary commitment to a profession or disci
pline.

Further, such individuals derive satisfaction

t'rom approval by peers and not from bureaucratic mana
gers.

The same observation has been made by many others

such as Blau and Scott and Gouldner.
1962i 244-246; Gouldner, 1957*

(Blau and Scott,

281-306)

Berkley

also notes what he perceives are the consequences for
organizations which attempt to stultify professionals.
It should he kept in mind that it is often
futile and may even be counterproductive for
an organization to try to break the profes
sional’s primary commitment to his own pro
fession rather than to the organization it
self. If the organization succeeds in doing
so, it may only be at the price of rendering
the professional incapable of giving the or
ganization what it most needs from him, name
ly the highest utilisation of his talents.
(Berkley, 1971* 71-72)
Berkley also mentions education as a factor, the
idea being that education increases noncomformity
in the individual and also increases his tolerance of
nonconformity in others.

There is some evidence to

support this proposition, as for example Samuel A.
Stouffer’s study, Communism. Conformity and Civil
Liberties.

(Stouffer, 1966)

After dividing a sample

of 5,000 Americans into categories of less tolerant,
in-between, and more tolerant, he found that only 20
per cent of all farmers and 30 per cent of all manuel
workers fell into the more tolerant category; however,
half of all managers, proprietors and officials, and
two-thirds of the professionals and semi-professionals
fell into the more tolerant category.
On the basis of the material reviewed it is possi
ble to draw certain tentative conclusions.

As regards
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the relationship between rationality and bureaucracy,
it appears possible that bureaucracies exhibit varying
degrees of rationality in both structure and behavior.
The possibility of anything less than completely ra
tional bureaucracies poses a question regarding, the
consequences of such practices for the achievement of
organizational goals.

For example, in the case of cor

porate bureaucracies would the use of nonrational prac
tices impede the achievement of profit?

Recognizing

that the terms nonrational and profit are relative, it
would seem, according to Weber's construct, that non
rational practices would tend to reduce profits and
pose a threat to the viability of the corporation.
In light of Weber®s construct the practices de
scribed by Whyte and others would have to be identified
as nonrational and, therefore, a part of the idea of
fealty described by Vanfossen and Berkley.

Accordingly,

if it were possible to isolate a corporate bureaucracy
which was moving from fealty to contract it should be
possible to identify some convergence with Weber's
theory, and to identify some of the features of the
movement noted by Vanfossen and Berkley.

A corporation

which was not acting rationally should be in some dif
ficulty as regards profits.

There could be numerous

reasons for such difficulty such as nonrational policies,
rules, etc.

A shift in the direction of rationality
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«ould, therefore, be marked by the adoption of rational
policies, the imposition and enforcement of rational
rules and an attendant increase in profits.

Weber him

self had a word to say in this regard.
Today, it is primarily the capitalist market
economy which demands that the official busi
ness of the administration be discharged pre
cisely, unambiguously, continuously, and with
as much speed as possible. Normally, the very
large, modern capitalist enterprises are them
selves unequalled models of strict bureaucratic
organization. (Gerth and Mills, 1946* 196-204)
If a firm was engaging in the kind of practices noted
by Whyte, Vanfossen and Berkley, one would expect to ob
serve a number of changes related to the relationship
between the individual and the corporation.

For example,

the criteria used to hire and promote personnel should
be purely objective and related to specific technical
competencies.

Further, an employee's viability in the

firm should be strictly a function of job performance,
and not personal ideosyncracies.

One might also expect

to see an increase in professional activity as the firm
shifts its attention from the personality traits of an
employee to his ability to perform a specific task.
There are, of course, many variables which poten
tially contribute to the financial viability of a cor
porate bureaucracy.

For the purpose of this study,

selected crucial variables will be seen in a logical
matrix in which to examine a shift in corporate nature

12
from one which is relatively nonrational to one which
g is more rational.

Specifically, variables such as com

pany policies, rules and practices are utilized and will
be examined in detail in Chapter II,
It was not seen as a purpose of this project to un
cover the causes of nonrational or fealty based adminis
trative practices (i.e. practices which act an an imped
iment to profit-making or are designed to elicit per
sonalized loyalty and obligation from employees), but
rather to identify such practices as existing prior to
to the imposition of a more rational administration with
a view toward examining their effect on the organization,
and their viability in the face of more rational admin
istration.
It would be possible to examine the types of rela
tionships noted above by means of survey methods and
secondary data analysis, but these methods could overlook
much of the dynamics of a major shift in managerial em
phasis#

For this reason it was decided to use the case

study method#

The problem then became to identify an

isolated situation in which the use of nonrational ad
ministrative methods may have been replaced by more
rational methods.

Since the organizational goal of

corporate bureaucracies is profit-making, a firm with
declining profits and, therefore, questionable finan
cial viability presented a potentially fruitful object
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of study#

Unfortunately, such companies often continue

to decline until they are dissolved. There are, however,
situations in which the trend toward corporate dissolution
is reversed.

A case in point is found in the phenomenon

of conglomerate mergers.
Conglomerates refer to large corporate entities
which have systematically acquired diverse corporations
over the past 20 years.

There have been varying opinions

held by economists regarding the rationale behind such
activity.

Donald Dewey has expressed the opinion that

a substantial proportion of firms being acquired fit
into the
1961s

category of potentially failing firms.

225)

(Dewey,

Building on this concept, Henry Manne

stated that if in fact this were the case, then this
type of merger activity should be looked upon simply
as a more efficient means of transferring corporate
assets, and thus, insuring continuity of corporate
activity.

(Manne, 1965»

110-20)

Another position

is that such merger activity is a move toward monopo
lies.

Whatever the economic reasoning behind such

activity, its increase is irrefutable.

The number of

such mergers increased from 99 mergers in 1966, to 16?
in 1967. and to 201 in 1968.

(FTC Report, 1969*

^2-49)

Given the fact that conglomerate merger does exist,
can conglomerate managerial activity be seen as rational?
One indicator may be found in the fact that firms acquired

by conglomerate merger between 19^8 and 1968 showed an
increase in absolute profit level of 25 per cent for
the median firm,

(FTC Report, 1969*

65)

Since the

goal of corporate bureaucracy is profit, it is not tinreasonable to assume that the managerial activity of
conglomerate administration is rationally based.

It

would, therefore, appear that a firm which is under
going (or has recently undergone) conglomerate mana
gerial succession would provide a fruitful milieu in
which to examine a shift from less to more rational
administration.

CHAPTER II
DIMENSIONS OF ANALYSIS

The literature in the field and a general famil
iarity with the firm to be studied suggested a number
of dimensions which would lend themselves to analysis?
however, the fact that the study was to be done by a
single investigator created the necessity to focus on
a few key dimensions.

Further, the succession situa

tion occasioned by conglomerate acquisition suggested
itself strongly as a microcosm in which to examine the
dynamics of a movement toward more rational bureau
cratic administration.

The object was to examine the

status of the dimensions of analysis before and after
succession.
Policies
Since the firm selected for study was in a state
of financial decline, it appeared that certain company
policies may have been dysfunctional with respect to
corporate goals, including both nonrational practices
and dysfunctional personnel in key positions.

In order

to probe the policy area, it was decided to focus on
policies regarding market diversification, willingness
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to accept cost-saving techniques and equipment, and the
use of strategic replacements*
These areas were selected because they represent
logical causes of corporate weakness which, if remedied,
could contribute materially toward the re-establishment
of corporate viability*

If a firm has a high degree of

product specialization and is facing a declining market,
a diversification of its market activities offers a pos
sible cure*

Accordingly, if a firm shows relatively high

production costs (and, therefore, low profits) procedures
and techniques which will reduce those costs without jeo
pardizing product quality offer a solution.

Further, the

existence of individuals in key positions who have demon
strated something less than the required degree of com
petence pose a threat to corporate viability.

The com

mon solution in a situation of managerial succession is
the use of strategic replacements, or the replacement
of pre-succession personnel with others who offer the
qualities of competence and cooperation.
Rules
Studies of managerial succession suggest that it
is often accompanied by the imposition of new rules and
the enforcement of old ones that are seen by the new
management as functional vis-a-vis organizational goals.
(Gouldner, 195^1 Guest, 1960$ Christiansen, 1953)

This

is particularly true of cases in which the successor has
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been sensitized to the role expectations of the com
pany as top management.

With regard to rules, Gouldner

was able to identify what he called an indulgency pat
tern which existed under the administration of the for
mer manager in his gypsum plant study.

This pattern

was characterized by failure to enforce rules, second
chances for rule infractions, pilfering of various
items for personal use, etc.

(Gouldner» 195*H

45-56)

There are, of course, several intervening variables
associated with the imposition of new rules and the en
forcement of old ones.

Gouldner identified a number of

them while probing resistance to the imposition of bu
reaucratic rules.

He found that resistance to bureau

cratization on the part of workers is based on percep
tions of expected role performance with regard to the
successor— If the workers* values support the "old ways"
the successor is expected to conform.

Another factor

which Gouldner linked with resistance is the degree to
which supervisors and workers perceive the new manager
as a legitimate successor.

In this regard Gouldner

offered the proposition that the degree to which bureau
cratic efforts will result in stable bureaucratic rou
tines depends partly on the degree to which those sub
ject to increasing bureaucratization resist those efforts.
Further, the strength of their resistance is a function
ofi

(1) their adherence to belief systems which are
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violated by bureaucratic measures, (2) conditions legit
imating active resistance, (3) conditions making resist
ance expedient, (^) the degree to which their status is
injured or impaired by increased bureaucratization, and
(5) the strength of the informal solidarity among the
resisters.

(Gouldner, 195^s 235-236)

Resistance to change, whether such change is a case
of managerial succession, the introduction of new tech
nologies, or the introduction of new production tech
niques, is largely a function of the manner in which the
Change is introduced.

Guest, for example, found that in

cases of managerial succession, the supervisory style
of the executive is crucial in determining the severity
of interaction problems.

(Guest, 1962s

189)

Coch and

French found in an early study of workers in a pajama
factory that when workers were allowed to participate
in the planning for the introduction of new production
techniques, resistance was kept to a minimum and coop
eration in the form of increased production and reduced
absenteeism was maximized.

(Coch and French, 19^8t

512-532)
There is some evidence to support the notion that
the kinds of factors which Gouldner noted as contri
buting to resistance would not be present in large,
highly bureaucratized organizations which do not have
the type of specialized occupational group which oper-

19
ates in near total isolation as did Gouldner's miners.
Both Gouldner and Grusky have noted that such firms
are less liable to disruption due to managerial suc
cession than small organizations.
Grusky, 1961s

261-269)

(Gouldner, 195^1

$hey attribute this relative

stability to a tendency for authority to be resident
in the office and not in the particular person,

Grusky

presented data to show that frequency of administra
tive succession at the top is directly related to the
size of the firm; he concluded that succession will be
rationally treated by being routinized in large firms,
and that because of their predispositions for stability,
bureaucracies require periodic succession at the top if
they are to adapt adequately to their environment*
A study done by Kriesberg concluded that the rate
of succession among heads of organizations is directly
related to organization size in at least certain public
agencies as well as in private corporations,
1962s

355-359)

(Kriesberg,

His analysis also suggests a possible

modification to Grusky*s thesis (Grusky, 1961?
269) regarding the same relationship,

261-

Grusky held that

greater size necessitates increased .bureaucratization
and this, in turn, increases the likelihood that suc
cession will be rationally treated by being routinized.
Kriesberg suggests that the career patterns of the
occupants of such leadership positions also affects the
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rate of succession®

In certain kinds of organizations,

such personnel may be more or less likely to expect to
move about in order to advance and to think that such
action is appropriate.

Kriesberg also conjectures that

where turnover is high, the incumbents tend to develop
career patterns which are consistent with that reality.
In that studies dealing with this point suggest a
relative freedom from the operation of intervening var
iables in large, occupationally heterogeneous firms,
and since the firm to be studied was large (25,000 em
ployees) , it was decided to use rational bureaucratic
rules as a dimension of analysis.

For the purpose of

this study, rational rules were defined as logically
contributing toward the achievement of organizational
goals, namely profit making.

The rules on which this

aspect of the study would focus were selected on the
basis of prior firsthand knowledge of the firm by the
investigator and include safety rules, overtime rules,
and an indulgency pattern.

Safety Rules
There are safety rules in most industries which
apply only to certain occupations.

Additionally, there

are some which apply to most or all personnel in a part
icular industry.

In the firm selected for this study,

rules concerning the wearing of hard hats and safety
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glasses were in the latter category.

Anyone who was

not in an office space was required or wear a hard hat
and safety glasses.

Since these safety rules had the

widest application it was decided to focus on these
rules and the punishments imposed for their violation.
Prior to succession the company clinic treated or re
ferred a large number of head and eye injuries each
week due to a failure to enforce the hard hat and safe
ty glasses rule.

This resulted in time lost from the

job ranging in duration from approximately one hour
to several weeks.

The failure to enforce these rules

could not be seen as rational vis-a-vis the work force
needed to meet production schedules, the requirement
to pay medical benefits, or the desire to maintain
high morale and a good safety record.

Overtime Rules
In any organization there are both formal and in
formal rules.

This fact has been well-documented by

Gouldner among others.

(Gouldner, 195*0

Although there

is often no stated rule governing a particular matter,
the wide use of an informal rule will sometimes fill
the gap.

This was true of rules governing the working

of overtime in the subject firm.

The investigator knew

of several instances where individuals who refused to
work overtime (for legitimate reasons) on a particular
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occasion were subsequently denied the opportunity to
work overtime even though they were needed on the job.
When some of these workers were again permitted to work
overtime, they developed a practice of "goofing-off" or
"slacking up" whereby they made time-and-a-half or double
time without contributing a normal shift's work.

On

one occasion a number of workers who refused to work
overtime were discharged resulting in a sympathy strike
by other workers.

The informal rules associated with

overtime presented another possible case of rules which
did not operate in service to organizational goals.

Indulgency Pattern

■ w a aae aa tfa iftji tw tmvmi

— w a w — —awn.

Certain aspects of the indulgency pattern identi
fied by Gouldner were not functional vis-a-vis attempts
at rational administration.

(Gouldner, 1

9

^5~56)

The firm selected for this study had a similar pattern
prior to succession, and it was, therefore, decided to
focus on three facets of this pattern in order to deter
mine their relationship to organizational goals.

The

aspects selected for study were* (1) the pilfering of
items for personal use, (2) borrowing tools and other
equipment for personal use and failing to return them,
and (3) "government jobs."
self-explanatory.

The first item is, of course,

Item two refers to a legitimate

practice whereby employees were permitted to borrow

tools and equipment for several days with the understand
ing that they would be returned.

This privilege was

severely abused resulting in the loss of much costly
equipment.

The third item refers to the practice of

having various kinds of personal projects accomplished
on company time, using company equipment, and more often
than not, company material.

Although the first two type

of infractions could be attributed primarily to lower
supervisory personnel and subordinates, the last type
was indulged in by members of all corporate levels.
Even at first glance the persistance of such practices
could be seen as antagonistic to rational corporate
administration.
Professionalization
It has been posited by Berkley and Vanfossen that
the process of professionalization has played a role
in the move toward bureaucratic administration based on
more contractual relations! however, it was not an ob
jective of this study to assess the conformity of given
occupations to accepted models of professionalization
such as those set forth by Y/ilensky, Caplow, and Green
wood.

(Wilensky, 1964i

140i Greenwood, 1957*

142-146j Caplow, 1954*

44-55)
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Rather, the purpose was

to determine if a purported increase in impersonality
associated with treatment, hiring, and promotion of

personnel, and a general trend toward more rational
corporate administration may have created an atmosphere
conducive to increased professional identification among
engineers.

For the purpose of this study professional

identification was defined as the use of a profession
as a reference.

As added indicators of professional

activity, it was also decided to use graduate degrees
acquired or in process and professional organization
membership.

Subjects pursuing graduate degrees in en

gineering, for example, could be assumed to have greater
professional orientation than those pursuing a Master’s
degree in business administration, since the latter
would indicate a choice to "make it" via the corporate
administrative route.

With regard to professional or

ganisation membership, Hall notes that those who use
the profession as a reference group also belong to and
attend the meetings of professional organizations.
(Hall, 19681

92-104)

Naturally, any increase in pro

fessional organization membership after succession had
to be greater than that which could be expected on the
basis of past membership growth.
Fealty to Contract
A stated objective of the study was a tentative

examination for evidence of Vanfossen’s thesis of the
movement from fealty to contract or, more specifically,
the replacement of relations based on personality by
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those of a secondary contractual nature.

It was assumed

that an organisation as large and highly "bureaucratized
as that studied would not have the degree of fealty that
would perhaps be manifested in a small, family-owned
firm; however, the investigator had noted in the pre
acquisition period, some vestigial traces of a fealty
syndrome.

Some examples of this phenomenon were?

(1) a

requirement that all staff and supervisory personnel
sign all rights to inventions and innovative procedures
over to the company; (2) the requirement that all exe
cutives join a particular country club; (3) the granting
of free time for personnel of all occupational levels
to attend launchings (the company was a shipyard), and
the promotion of a "look what our team effort created"
atmosphere; (4) the punishment of personnel for refusal
to work overtime; and (5) the dismissal or badgering
of personnel (particularly upper level types) for nonconforming behavior, i.e., modes of dress and manner
perceived as being aberrant vis-a-vis accepted upper
level norms.

Since such practices had direct appli

cation to Vanfossen’s thesis, it was decided to examine
the status of such practices after succession.

CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODS

The firm in question was acquired by conglomerate
merger approximately three years before execution of
this research and was not purposefully studied prior
to that time*

Although the method used to investigate

the preacquisition period may have initially appeared
unorthodox« it was felt that the means proposed satis
fied the requirements of an exploratory study*
Prior to undertaking the study of sociology, the
investigator was employed by the subject firm for six
and one-half years.

During that period he occupied

positions in the occupational hierarchy ranging from
one paying the lowest hourly wage to one which would
be termed salaried middle-management (Department Head).
He also held intermediate positions which fall into
the category of staff personnel.

The range of these

positions provided exposure to policies, values, and
both formal and informal relations at all corporate
levels.

Associations with members of the firm ranged

from the Vice-Presidential level to the lowest posi
tions in the occupational hierarchy.
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The general
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corporate hierarchy is represented in Figure 1.

It

should be noted that this figure refers to production
segments*

There are also large engineering departments

with their own heads and section supervisors*

After

JLeaving the firm the investigator maintained associa
tions with individuals at most of these levels which
provided access to the plant, its personnel, and some
records for the purpose of executing this study*

It

was felt that the investigator®s knowledge of the firm
supported by secondary data and interview statements
from individuals (from representative corporate levels
and employed by the firm for a minimum of five years)
would provide sufficient insight into the preacquisi
tion period*

Secondary data consisted of information

from official records, memoranda, posters, newspaper
articles, etc.
Interviews used to explore the various dimensions
of analysis were conducted both inside and outside of
the physical plant.

In order to conduct in-plant in

terviews and to make general observations the investi
gator assumed two roles.

The first was that of a visi

tor, and the second was that of employee capable of
circulating freely throughout most of the plant.

Inter

views conducted outside of the plant were arranged
through contacts employed by the firm, and except in
those cases where the investigator was known to the

Board of Directors

President

Vice President

Vice President

Vice President

Division Head

Division Head

Division Head

Department Head

Department Head

Section Supervisor

Section Supervisor

Section Supervisor

Shift Supervisors

Shift Supervisors

Shift Supervisors

Department Head

Workers 1st thru
3rd class

Workers Helpers
Fig. 1. —

The Corporate Hierarchy of National Shipyard
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informant, the informant was simply asked to partici
pate in a survey.

In the latter case informants were

not told of the investigator's former association with
the Company.

Data from interviews were in some cases

recorded during the interview.

In those cases where

it was not advantageous for the informants to know
they were being interviewed, data were recorded pri
marily in a small locked equipment room immediately
after the interview.

It was often impossible to con

veniently return to this room for recording data, and
in those instances, the closes men's room was utilized.
Dimensions of Analysis
The subjects interviewed to obtain information
regarding specific analytical dimensions were drawn
from those levels of the corporate hierarchy which
the investigator deemed most applicable.

There was

no attempt to achieve representative samples in a
statistical sense.

Further, the type of interview

(either nonstandardized or nonscheduled standardized)
varied depending upon specific interview settings.

Policies
The subjects for interviews pertaining to this
aspect of the study were drawn from among those indi
viduals who were most likely to have a degree of famil
iarity with policy matters before and after succession.
All of the subjects were known to the investigator.
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The group consisted of 26 individuals who were distri
buted in the corporate hierarchy as followsi

2 vice-

presidents, 4 division heads, 5 assistant division
heads, 7 department heads, and 8 assistant department
heads (see Figure 1).

Interviews were of the non

scheduled standardized type and were conducted in
private both inside and outside of the plant.
Market diversification - Subjects were asked to
comment on areas of nonshipbuilding activity engaged
in by the company during the period prior to succession.
The subjects were then asked to comment on nonship
building activities following succession.

No attempt

was made to direct the conversation to activities with
which the investigator had some degree of familiarity.
In order to determine the number and type of alter
ations in the organizational structure associated v/ith
diversification, the subjects were also asked to list
the names of departments or offices created specifi
cally to deal with nonshipbuilding activity since suc
cession.

The information obtained from interviews was

supplemented with information from organizational charts,
memoranda, and news clippings.
Willingness to accent cost-saving techniques - The
subjects were initially asked to discuss the company*s
willingness to accept such techniques prior to succes
sion.

They were also asked to comment upon their per
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ceptions of the consequences resulting from the failure
to adopt innovative techniques and to identify the locus
of perceived resistance.

Informants were then asked to

comment on their perceptions of the same subject follow
ing succession.

Interview data for this dimension were

supplemented by information from various memoranda and
department records regarding the proposal and operation
of cost-saving techniques.
Strategic Replacements - In order to determine if*
and to what extent, Diversico employed the practice of
strategic replacements, subjects were asked to comment
on high level positions filled during the period follow
ing succession.

They were also asked if the positions

were filled from inside or outside the organization,
and additionally, to offer their opinions regarding the
level of competence of the individuals who were replaced.
The use of strategic replacements can sometimes have
a "percolation effect" in which one new appointee will
in turn replace individuals in subordinate positions
with those persons which he feels will accord him the
greatest measure of loyalty.

In an effort to identify

the presence of a "percolation effect," subjects were
asked to cite instances of office holders who were re
placed in subordinate positions.
Information obtained from interviews was supported
by data from organizational charts, newspaper clippings
and memoranda.

Official records were also used where
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possible to indicate levels of departmental performance
which may have resulted in strategic replacements.

Fur

ther, the data were analyzed to determine if the positions
replaced formed any particular pattern with regard to
overall control and efficiency.

Rules
The subjects used to obtain data pertaining to this
dimension consisted of those used in the policy probe and
33 others contacted by the investigator while circulat
ing in the plant posing as an employee.

The type of

interview was of the nonscheduled standardized variety.
Safety rules - It was sometimes possible to contact
a number of employees when work groups were encountered
on the job or on lunch break.

The object was to deter

mine simply if the workers perceived ongoing efforts to
enforce the hard hat and safety glasses rule.

Conversa

tion in this regard was generally initiated by saying
something on the order of “This hard hat sure is hot.
I took if off a while ago and got chewed out by a
supervisor."

This inevitably led to a discussion of

enforcement before and after the company was acquired
by Diversico.

The approach noted above was obviously

not required for informants known to the investigator.
Interview data were supplemented by data from the
records of the Safety Department and the company clinic
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for a period of two years prior to succession and two
years following succession#

In addition, memoranda

and interviews were used to compare the type of punish
ment leveled for violation of the rules.
Overtime rules - The informants used to explore
this dimension consisted of a separate group of 28
individuals contacted in an effort to avoid arousing
the suspicion of workmen questioned regarding safety
rules#

All interviews associated with overtime rules

were held in the plant and were of the nonstandardized
type.

Some interviews were conducted on-the-job, hut

the greatest proportion took place on lunch breaks#
The lunch break context was conducive to contacting
a number of individuals at the same time.
In most cases conversation regarding overtime was
initiated by the investigator by offering a comment
similar to ®*This overtime is really starting to get. me
down.'1 Such comments were then followed by an account
of anger directed at him (the investigator) for declin
ing a supervisor's request that he work overtime on
the previous Saturday#

The excuse given by the invest

igator for refusing to work the overtime was in all
cases one that would be perceived as legitimate by
the workmen#

One such excuse was the need to take

his child to a medical specialist in a city which was
some distance away.

This hypothetical situation was

used to elicit open-ended conversation about overtime
which was guided as necessary to obtain information on
the pre-succession handling of overtime.

An attempt

was also made to isolate examples of informal rules
applying to overtime and perceptions of workers regard
ing their output while working overtime as compared to
normal shifts.
The interviews described above were supplemented
by production records from selected departments which
compared output on regular shifts and overtime shifts.
In addition, an attempt was made to discover the method
of handling overtime in the post-succession period by
using interviews and production records.
Indulgency oattern - The subjects for this aspect
of the study included those used for the policy question
plus an additional group of 23 individuals contacted in
the plant.

Interviews relating to the indulgency pattern

were nonstandardized and conducted inside and outside of
the plant.
The function of the interviews was to obtain exam
ples of pilfering, failing to return legitimately bor
rowed tools, and "government jobs."

There was no need

to employ leading questions during interviews with the
first group noted above; however, the subjects who were
not known to the investigator required a more delicate
approach.

This was due to the fact that violators were
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potentially subject to reprisal and informants could
conceivably be linked to violators• Therefore, the
investigator did not probe the indulgency pattern un
til the third or fourth meeting with these subjects in
an effort to establish a modicum of confidence.
The subject of the various aspects of the pattern
was broached by the use of statements regarding a third
party supposedly known to the investigator.

For example,

"A guy I know had some great brass hardware made for
his boat in here last month.”

When one statement was

insufficient to elicit conversation, other examples
were cited until the subjects offered examples of their
own.

There were instances where the subjects refused

to pursue the subject.

In such cases the investigator

merely changed the topic of conversation.

An attempt

was made to focus on such practices before and after
succession by probing as inconspicuously as possible
for the approximate time of each incident.
Supplementary data used to show the extent of such
practices in the pre-succession period consisted of tool
room records and material and labor cost records.

The

same types of records plus various memoranda and notices
were used to compare the extent of this indulgency pat
tern in the post-succession period.

Professionalization
Informants in this area consisted of 32 individuals
with at least a Bachelor of Science degree in some en
gineering field.
investigator.

None of the subjects were known to the

The interviews were nonscheduled standard

ized and were held in homes of the subjects on the pre
text of conducting an attitude survey regarding the move
ment of the locus of city government from the downtown
area to one of the more populous outlying areas.

It

was, of course, necessary to ask some questions regard
ing the supposed subject of the interview; however, the
information required for this study was obtained from
*

the routine questions normally posed at the beginning
of such questionnaires as name, age, etc.
Professional identification - During the time that
the investigator was employed by National, it was not
uncommon to hear an engineer respond "I work for Nation
al," when asked what he did for a living.

The 32 in

formants v/ere drawn from a group of individuals who
were asked that question on a questionnaire distributed
by a local organization in 1966.

These individuals

continue’to be employed by National, and all responded
that they worked for National when answering that
particular question.

The subjects were asked the same

question during the attitude survey to determine if
their mode of response had altered following succession.
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Graduate degrees - Information regarding graduate
degrees held or in process was also obtained from pre
liminary questions associated with the survey.

Subjects

were asked to state the specific field in which the de
gree was held or currently being pursued.
Professional organization membership - In order to
determine if there had been an increase in professional
organization activity following succession, the subjects
were asked if they held membership in such organizations
and, if so, which ones.

Further, the records of three

local chapters of national engineering or technical
societies and one local engineering organization were
examined to probe for the extent of participation in
such activities by National engineers.

The records

searched covered the periods three years prior to suc
cession and three years following succession.

Fealty to Contract
The policies group also served as subjects for
this dimension.

Interviews were nonstandardized and

were held either in the homes of subjects or in the
plant.

In both cases, the interviews were conducted

in private.
Informants were asked open-ended questions re
garding the kinds of items noted in the fealty to con
tract segment of Chapter II.

An attempt was made to
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uncover additional pre-succession examples and to deter
mine the extent of such practices in the post-succession
period.

Where possible, interview data were supplemented

with information from records and memoranda.
The Research Setting
In an effort to preserve the anonymity of the sub
jects participating in this study, fictitious names are
used for organizations and individuals.
National Shipyard was established in the late nine
teenth century and enjoyed comfortable growth until 1965.
From the time of its inception until 1938, the firm de
rived its revenue primarily from repair and construction
work related to civilian vessels.

The firm's outstand

ing growth period occurred during the period 1938 to
1946.

With the advent of World War II, the firm's

chief production emphasis became the construction of
vessels for the U. S. Navy, and its work force increased
from approximately five thousand employees to a peak
employment in excess of twenty thousand persons.

By

1925, the firm was deeply entrenched in what could be
characterized as a ship-building tradition.

Management

and workers tended to cling to a perceived inherent
rightness of the "old ways."

Although the firm posted

an admirable shipbuilding record during the war one
current executive who was employed during that period

39
statedi
I thought we'd never get geared up because
no one seemed willing to try any new tech
niques to improve production.
Following the war boom, the size of the work force
declined and although Navy construction continued, it
did not account for the company's major source of re
venue.

The second major growth period occurred during

the period 1958 to 1965 as a result of the priority
placed by the Navy on certain types of ship construction.
Following an employment decline after World War II, the
work force again swelled to approximately twenty thou
sand employees.

It was also possible to note during

this period a significant increase in the number of
staff personnel due to various new technologies asso
ciated with constructing and outfitting highly sophis
ticated vessels.

Navy contracts during this period

accounted for approximately 75 per cent of National's
work.
It should be noted that during this same period
National did attempt to turn its resources toward
market diversity and was successful in one area— the
production of a type of large industrial machinery
component.

An attempt to enter the field of large

metal components in service to another type of indus
try was unsuccessful due to a failure to adopt and
apply certain testing techniques.

This incident will

later be covered in greater detail.
During the mid-sixties the Navy altered its ship
construction priorities and one type of construction
was terminated on a national scale.

It was at this

point that National's financial viability began to
decline and# to compound the problem, contracts for
the construction of civilian vessels were practically
non-existent.

It was after three years of declining

profits and failure to diversify that National was
merged with one of the leading conglomerate enter
prises— Diversico•

CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS

The data reported in the first segment of this
section dealt with the specific dimensions of analysis
selected for the study while the concluding segment
consists of general observations based on the investi
gator's travels through the plant.
Policies
The general consensus among subjects interviewed
pointed to the fact that pre-succession policies were
not conducive to the financial viability of the com
pany.

Although many of the subjects voiced some dis

content regarding the impersonality with which policy
changes were executed, they v/ere, without exception,
in agreement with the long run goals of such policies.
^Referring to Diversico *s intention to put the company
on a sound footing, one vice-president commented:
I haven't seen such singleness of purpose
since the war years.
A department head commenting on the overall alteration
in mode of operation noted:
The difference is like what you'd exper
ience in stepping from a Model A into a
new Lincoln Continental.
41
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Comments in general pointed to the fact that company
operation was a great deal smoother than in the pre
succession era.

Market Diversification
When asked to comment on the subject of market
diversification prior to succession, most subjects
noted a failure to pursue civilian contracts in the
face of declining government work.

One executive

noted:
Some top people thought we could rest on
our laurels forever, but the profit and
loss picture didn* t agree with them. We
were in trouble.
The subjects were able to recall only two areas of suc
cessful nonshipbuilding activity before Diversico admin
istration.

One was the fabrication of a large industrial

component for another type of industry.

Further probing

revealed that National's foundry facility was the only
one in the country capable of handling castings of that
size.

Hence the company had no real competition in this

area.

On the surface this would appear to be an ideal

situation? however, the demand for these castings was
very limited due to the infrequency with which they were
needed and the limited market to which they applied.
The second area of activity was the contracting of
key personnel to the government for certain aspects of

*3
nuclear training reactor construction.

Although this

provided work for a number of specialised personnel,
it was also tied to the potential inconsistency of
fund allocation by the federal government and did not
solve the immediate problem.

Urging by the investiga

tor to recall other areas resulted in a good deal of
head scratching but did not contribute to a history
of successful nonshipbuilding activity.
Twenty of the 26 subjects noted the fact that the
need to diversify was brought up at a number of top
level meetings but no specific action was taken.

The

subjects also noted that many proposals were submitted
that, in their judgment, were feasible, but reaction
was usually negative.

Those in control felt it was

more appropriate to remain within the realm of ship
building activity.

In point of fact, the only alter

native to government construction was civilian con
struction! however, merchant marine activity was such
that new construction was practically nonexistent.
The shipyards in the United States were encountering
fierce competition from foreign yards which had a
capability of producing ships of far greater capa
city for a fraction of the cost of domestic construc
tion.

Consequently, what little construction was

being done for American shipping lines was contracted
to foreign firms.

Commenting on foreign competition

one executive said:
We tried to compete in the tanker market by
offering conversions which would nearly doub
le the size of existing tankers , but the oil
companies found they could get a new vessel
of greater capacity for less cost from our
foreign competition.
All of the subjects noted one unsuccessful attempt
at diversification which one executive characterized as
a “last ditch effort.“

This project involved the fab

rication of large metal components for an industry which
was flourishing in the face of public approval, success,
and the allocation of federal funds.

One subject com

mented:
Many of us thought that this was the answer.
We put some of the best talent we had on the
job.
Since this attempt at diversification was mentioned by
23 subjects, it was possible to reconstruct an account
of what one employee called “The

Fiasco.”

National*s role in the project was that of a sub
contractor.

Therefore, specifications were submitted

by the prime contractor who had direct relations with
the applicable government agency.

The contract called

for the components to be constructed of a very exotic
metal which had a history of welding problems.

In

point of fact, no successful welding technique had
been established.

One subject noted:

That was a red light that we should have
heeded. We should have dropped it like
a hot potato right there.

Another said:
We went through as many production schedule
revisions as we went through welding rods.
The latter comment very nearly sums up the story
on the construction phase.

Testing revealed defect

after defect in the welds resulting in countless de
lays for repairs and re-testing.

As the project fell

far behind production schedules, impatience increased
and the principals involved began to make concessions
on the size of acceptable defects in welds.

Finally,

it was decided to subject the entire component to the
last test procedure which was a hydrostatic test at
high pressure (the component is filled with water
under pressure).

It was concurrently decided to eli

minate one of the types of weld inspection methods
which revealed a critical type of defect.

The results

was complete failure of the component under pressure.
One subject commented:
It was a real black eye for the company.
The data extracted from interviews revealed that
the company's pre-succession record of market diversi
fication was not impressive, and that there appeared
to be a reluctance on the part of top management to
diversify in nonshipbuilding areas.
When asked to respond regarding the current trend
in market diversification, the subjects all noted that
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National was committed to a number of nonshipbuilding
areas.

The list totaled 11 areas which ranged from

supplying basic design services to ocean mining.

In

conjunction with diversification, National had increased
its labor force by approximately six thousand employees,
and a recent news release notes the president as saying
that the company was showing a "strong profit.”

The

evidence on conglomerates tends to support this kind
of progress.

Further, the careful, top management

teams associated with conglomerates do not character
istically make rash statements regarding profits.

One

subject noted that the company had a contractual busi
ness backlog of 1*5 billion dollars, a statement which
is also supported by a recent news release.
Interviews revealed that prior to Diversico* s
administration there was only one department devoted
to the development of new market areas.

At the time

of this study National had three departments devoted
to various aspects of this function.

A comparison of

organization charts before and after succession sup
port the observations made during interviews.

An indi

cation of the emphasis placed by management on the
function of these new departments is revealed in the
following excerpt from a memorandum directed to the
heads of supporting departments:
...in an era of rapidly changing technology
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new areas of work are, and will remain, es
sential to the life of the company. You are,
therefore, requested to provide high-priority
support to
Departments.

Willingness to Accept Cost-Saving Techniques
All of the subjects interviewed noted a certain de
gree of pre-succession reluctance to accept cost-saving
techniques, and one felt so strongly about a certain
rejected proposal that he commented:
If we had accepted the _______procedure
at the time it was proposed, there might
have been no need to merge.
Six

informants told ofone proposal that had gone as far

as a trial implementation stage.

The proposal dealt

with a more efficient means of installing certain kinds
of shipboard machinery.

The records of the department

in question indicated that after a two month trial period
the man-hours required to install the machinery had been
reduced by 20 per cent.

On the basis of such performance

one would assume that the procedure would be adopted}
however, the procedure was dismissed out-of-hand by the
department head because "he didn't trust it.”
One proposal which was cited by a total of 20 in
formants dealt

with an

innovative

material from purchase to distribution.

systemfor handling
These infor

mants noted that the existing system was notoriously
poor and resulted in severe production delays.

They

further noted that the proposed method held the promise
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of significant improvement.

A search of the records

revealed that according to the best evidence available
the procedure in question would have improved material
handling efficiency by 35

cent.

The proposal re

ceived strong opposition from one vice-president and
was not adopted.

There were many other examples noted

which were individually of lesser consequence, but
from a cumulative standpoint would have resulted in
considerable yearly savings to the firm.
The perceptions of the subjects regarding the
locus of resistance to cost-saving techniques are shown
in Table 1.

TABLE 1
PERCEIVED LOCI OF RESISTANCE TO
COST-SAVING TECHNIQUES

Office
President
Vice President
Division Head
Department Head
Section Supervisor
Shift Supervisor

Frequency
1
3

10

5
3
4
26
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The data show that division heads were most frequently
identified as the source of resistance.

It is also

interesting to note that the four division heads among
the informants cited their own level as the primary
locus of resistance to cost-saving techniques.
The informants all agreed generally that many costsaving procedures had been adopted and implemented in
the post-succession period.

Oddly enough, one of the

first was a procedure to improve material handling.
When asked to comment regarding the similarity between
the present method and the one that had been proposed,
all subjects said that they were essentially the same.
One department head told of a relatively minor
procedure that had been adopted to reclaim a valuable
element from a procession solution.

The total equip

ment outlay to implement the procedure was $250, and
the resale of the element in question resulted in a
new source of income averaging $10,000 per month.
Another department head noted a procedure associated
with steel plate cutting which reduced by one-half the
amount of time formerly expended to cup plate.

He noted

further that the cost of the new equipment was absorbed
in the first three months of operation.
All informants were able to offer at least three
examples of new cost-saving techniques, and some offer
ed as many as ten.

The figures given during interviews
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for the examples noted were supported by department
operation records•

Strategic Replacements
The informants generally agreed that Diversico#s
take over had indeed been accompanied by a process of
strategic replacements.

One executive notedj

A lot of the faces that had been around here
for twenty years or more are no longer around.
Another saidj
Personnel changes had to happen, otherwise
we'd have been in the same boat as the
period before the merger.
Although Diversico had announced via the news media
that no significant personnel changes would occur, the
names on the organizational charts offer evidence to the
contrary.

The first change to take place after the mer

ger was the "promotion" of the president to Chairman of
the Board.

Concurrently, a Diversico employee of long

standing was appointed to fill the position of president.
All of the subjects seemed to feel that no other changes
were forthcoming since a period of several months went
by without further change.
Several months after the new president assumed his
responsibilities, a vice-president announced his early
retirement.

His replacement was also a Diversico em

ployee from outside the firm.

According to informants
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this incident was followed by what one subject called
"a rash of personnel changes,"

During a period of a

few months the heads of two divisions had been replaced,
and the former heads were given positions which could be
called lateral moves.

Within a short period of time

one of the former division heads retired.

Of the two

positions in question one was filled from outside the
firm, and the other was filled by a young assistant
division head who had a reputation for efficiency.

Of

the 26 informants, 18 noted that the two division heads
who were replaced lacked competence.

An examination of

the records of both of the divisions in question indi
cated poor production records.
The two changes of division heads noted above re
sulted in five changes at the department head level.

In

all cases, the replacements were young and had reputa
tions for aggressiveness and efficiency.

The records

of only three of the departments in question were acces
sible for examination, and all showed a low ratio of
production to man hours expended.

The changes in de

partment heads resulted in the appointment of no less
than 13 section supervisor and shift supervisor changes.
Of the nine changes at this level which the investigator
was able to follow-up, eight were individuals who were
young and had relatively close relations with the new
department heads.
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It is almost certain that there were many other
lower level changes which were not reported during
interviews.

Regarding recent changes at the upper

level, the Diversico president has been elevated to
the position of Chairman of the Board replacing the
retiring National chairman, and the vice-president
appointed by Diversico has been elevated to senior
vice-president.

Although the newly appointed presi

dent was not formerly a Diversico employee, he was
brought in from outside the firm and is a compara
tively young man (^5) with a strong record in cor
porate administration.
Rules
The data with respect to these dimensions indi
cate in general that Diversico had a greater degree
of consciousness about the enforcement of rules than
did the former management.

For example, it was pos

sible to observe a plethora of signs pertaining to
the wearing of hard hats and safety glasses.

More

significant, however, was the fact that everyone the
investigator encountered in the plant was, in fact,
wearing a hard hat and safety glasses.

In the in

vestigator’s experience, this was not formerly the
case.

One could also observe signs admonishing

against waste of materials#

One executive commented*
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What actually remains unsaid, but under
stood, on the waste signs is a warning
against pilfering.
When asked why the signs did not refer specifically to
pilfering, he said2
Some people seem to feel that kind of
thing would sound too much like a gestapo regime.

The informants admitted freely that there was noth
ing new about the hard hat and safety glasses rules?
however, they conceded that the former laxity regarding
enforcement was gone.

One worker commenting on the

swiftness with which the enforcement began saidi
I guess it was about two weeks after the
new president came in that the plant guards
and supervisors really began to crack down.
Another saidi
We always had a bunch of signs around say
ing we had to wear _ _ _ _ hard hats, but
when Diversico showed up they put up more
signs all over the _ _ _ _ _ place.
Of the 59 informants in this aspect of the study,
all agreed that Diversico was making a greater effort
toward the enforcement of the rules than the pre-suc
cession management.

Although the hard hats and safety

glasses were accepted as a matter of course at the time
of the study, the early period of enforcement was marked
by a great deal of overt attention to the matter.

One

5^
group of workers underscored the sentiments of their
spokesman who noted*
I reckon that sup (supervisor) was on my
for a month after the word came out.
The "word” came in the form of a lengthy memorandum
from the vice-presidential level to the division heads
giving specific instructions to have the "word" dis
seminated to every man in their divisions.

The mem

orandum noted specifically that offenders were to be
laid off a day for each infraction of the rule.

One

executive noted:
A few union officials reacted unfavorably
to the ruling, but they were made to under
stand that it was in the best interest of
the employees.
Commenting about the number of lay-offs one division
head said:
We had quite a few (one department of 1,400
men had 25) in the first three or four weeks,
but they gradually tapered off to nothing.
One shift supervisor said regarding the reaction of two
men that he had to lay-off:
They were ______ -off for a couple of days
then they forgot about it. I hated like
_______ to do it. I've been knowing some
of these boys for ten years.
The workers in general harbored no animosity re
garding the initial period of enforcement.

One of the

33 workers contacted had been laid-off during the first
week of the regime.

He commented*

55
I wasn't happy about it, but we all knew
when the new people (Diversico) came in
there'd be some changes.
When asked about his attitude toward the supervisor
who imposed the punishment, the same worker saids
Hell, he didn't have any choice, the big
boy was on his _____ too.
A search of the clinic records for a period of two
years prior to succession indicated that they had treat
ed averages of 2k and 16 eye and head injuries per week
respectively.

During the first two years after succes

sion, the averages had been reduced to 13 and 7 per week
respectively.

The data would appear to show that enforce

ment reduced the number of such injuries by almost onehalf even in the face of a growing employee population.

Overtime Rules
Prior to undertaking the interviewing of the 28
workmen regarding overtime, one vice-president and
three division heads were questioned concerning the
existence of pre-succession rules governing the work
ing of overtime.

The four individuals in question all

responded that there were no formal rules except to
specify the amount that individuals in various cate
gories would be paid for such work.

When a department

head perceived a need to work overtime to meet a given
schedule he simply passed instructions to supervisors

56
to select the number of men required to staff the work
to be done on a particular shift.
It should be noted that National employees have
historically worked a great deal of overtime and many
workmen have their standard of living gauged tothat
extra income.

Consequently, the denial of overtime is

a sore point among workers.

One worker said*

If they cut off my overtime, ain't no way
I could make my payments.
Two other workers present at the time supported his
statement.

When the worker in question heard of the

investigator's problem concerning a refusal to work
overtime he saids
I don't turn any of it down. But the
supervisor screwed him (pointing to a
member of the group) for saying no.
When questioned, the workman to whom the informant re
ferred recounted a story of a death in the family which
required traveling to a neighboring state to attend the
funeral.

The subject saids

George (the supervisor) was so
off
that he wouldn't give me any overtime for
a month after the funeral. I fixed his
though. On the first Saturday job
I crawled into a tank and slept for a
couple of hours.
Of the 28 workers interviewed, nine were able to
give accounts of this type of retaliation for the denial
to work overtime.

One welder remarked that they (welders)

are issued a given number of welding rods to weld speci-

fied lengths of weld joints.

He described seeking hi

revenge by laying welding rods end to end in the weld
joint and welding over them during several overtime
shifts.

The object of this procedure was to make it

appear as though he had used his quota of rods.

When

asked if he was afraid of having his actions detected
he said:
Those
welds ain't x-rayed any
way. Ain't nobody gonna find out.
Some light was shed on the actual need to work
overtime during two chance interviews with staff per
sonnel.

Both described a practice of informing the

department head of a need to work overtime although
the need did not actually exist.

Since staff person

nel worked on special projects independent of other
workers, this type of practice was relatively easy to
implement.

One staff person mentioned doing this

every weekend for a period of six months.
A comparison of the production between the same
number of regular shifts and overtime shifts for two
departments indicated that there was indeed a dispar
ity between the two.

With both the men and the type

of work held constant there was an average reduction
per shift on overtime shifts of 59*66 and 72.0 units
of production for Department A and B respectively.
These data are shown in Tables 2 and 3*
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TABLE 2
A COMPARISON OF REGULAR AND OVERTIME SHIFT PRODUCTION

BEFORE SUCCESSION

Department A
Regular

Overtime

Shifts

Number
of Men

Production
(Units)

Number
of Men

Production
(Units)

1
2
3
4
5
6

15
23
9
18
32
29

180
2?6
135
246
384
348

15
23
9
18
32
29

146
218
98
1?6
290
283

TABLE 3
A COMPARISON OF REGULAR AND OVERTIME SHIFT PRODUCTION
BEFORE SUCCESSION

Department B
Regular

Overtime

Shifts

Number
of Men

Production
(Units)

Number
of Men

Production
(Units)

1
2
3
4
5
6

40
26
33
38
29
42

600
338
495
456
430
630

40
26
33
38
29
42

507
276
413
397
385
539

Interviews revealed that in the post-succession
period the kind of capricious supervisory behavior de
scribed above was not in evidence.

None of the 28 in

dividuals questioned was able to recall a single inci
dent of this type after succession.

Nor was it any

longer possible to make arbitrary decisions concerning
the need to work overtime.

The new administration had

set forth a very specific procedure for the clearing of
overtime work which called for documented evidence of
need which required ultimate clearance at the division
level.

Further, an examination of the production re

cords of Departments A and B under the same criteria
as for the pre-succession period, revealed the follow
ings (1) the variation in the average number of units
between regular and overtime shifts for Department A
was 0.8 and (2) the variation for Department B under
the same conditions was 1.3*
in Tables 4 and 5*

These data are shown
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TABLE 4
A COMPARISON OF REGULAR AND OVERTIME SHIFT PRODUCTION
AFTER SUCCESSION

Department A
Overtime

Regular
Shifts

Number
of Men

Production
(Units)

Number
of Men

Production
(Units)

1
2
3
4
5
6

25
17
31
28
13
10

302
255
372
364
169
148

25
17
31
28
13
10

297
261
380
356
175
146

1,610

1,615

TABLE 5
A COMPARISON OF REGULAR AND OVERTIME SHIFT PRODUCTION
AFTER SUCCESSION

Department B
Regular
lifts
1
2
3
4
5
6

Number
of Men
44
35
28
51
37
27

Overtime
Production
(Units)
663
455
421
764
556
302
3,161

Number
of Men
44
35
28
51
37
27

Production
(Units)
668
449
427
757
562
290
3,153
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The relative insignificance of the average varia
tions between regular and overtime shifts for the post
succession examination would indicate that Diversico
not only established but enforced formal rules regard
ing the working of overtime.

Indulgency Pattern
It was the object of this segment to obtain infor
mation regarding pilfering, failure to return legitimate
ly borrowed tools, and government jobs."

Due to the

sensitivity of this area not all of the individuals con
tacted were willing to volunteer information.

The nat

ural reluctance that one might expect in this area was
compounded by the fact that a recent investigation of
such matters by Diversico resulted in legal action di
rected at a number of individuals, including one lowerlevel executive.

This individual’s major responsibility

was the disposal (by sale) of used equipment ranging
from office machines to cranes.

The evidence would

indicate that the individual was disposing of such
items at a considerable profit, part of which was ille
gitimately accruing to him.

The object of presenting

this brief account is to underscore the fact that parti
cipation in any aspect of the indulgency pattern is not
necessarily confined to lower functionaries.
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Pilfering - This particular aspect of the pattern
was found to be widespread among blue collar and lower
level white collar employees during the pre-succession
period.

Accounts given by informants showed that the

types of objects ranged from paper clips to various
■types of machinery.

As regards the former, one staff

person noted that one dozen boxes of paper clips (100
per box) were "used" in a single week after receipt of
the office supplies order.

When asked' about the possi

bility that they might simply have been in the desks
of various individuals the informant saidi
There wasn*t a paper clip to be found in
the place. We had to re-order«
Another informant told of an individual who had
welding equipment at home with which he made extra
income by doing odd welding jobs.

This individual

allegedly stole 50 pounds of assorted types of welding
rods in the course of a single month.

The details of

this account were supported by the statements of two
other informants, one of which noted*
You know that ___ of a _____ jnade about
$250 on the side in a month.
One of the most intriguing accounts was that con
cerning an individual who systematically pilfered vari
ous types of electrical wire, switches, fuses, and fix
tures for the purpose of completely wiring the home he
was constructing.

Another informant supplemented this

63
account by saying:
He didn't just wire the ______ house, but
his homemade trailer to boot.
Although one could not condone this individual's dis
honesty, it would be necessary to concede that he pos
sessed a significant degree of resourcefulness.
One informant told of an acquaintance who (also
quite systematically) removed the component parts of
a machine and re-assembled the machine at home for his
own jise.

A check of the Sears catalog revealed that

this particular machine retails for $395*
There were a number of other accounts of a similar
nature the mentioning of which would unduely add to the
length of this report; however, the data gleaned from
even this small number of interviews would indicate that
the practice was relatively widespread.

Of the seventeen

separate accounts given not one occurred in the post
succession period.
Failure to return legitimately borrowed tools - The
interviews did not reveal a great deal regarding this
particular aspect of the study.

Only two accounts of

this type of offense were volunteered by informants,
both of which involved blue collar employees.

One con

cerned the failure to return a small grinder (average
retail - $35)t and the other concerned a block and
tackle, a paint sprayer and compressor, and a belt
sander all borrowed by one person (average total retail
cost - $150).

The upper level employees interviewed
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appeared to be too far removed from the problem to have
an awareness of specific details.
A search of tool room records proved to be a great
deal more instructive than the interviews.

During a six

month period approximately one year prior to succession,
the company lost $^,200 in unreturned tools and equipment
with absolutely no account of action taken against the
offenders.
It v/as not necessary to examine the records for the
post-succession, since the privilege has been discontinued
by the Diversico administration.

A memorandum to this

effect stated in parts
.......due to the inordinate amount of addi
tional paper work and materials handling,
the borrowing of tools by employees will be
discontinued effective.....
The memorandum made no mention of losses associated with
the practice and it was the opinion of certain executives
that Diversico did not wish to overtly question the in
tegrity of its employees during the sensitive transition
period.
"Government jobs" - The data revealed examples of
this practice which embraced most employee classifica
tions from blue collar to executives.

Perhaps the most

common among lower level ,white collar employees was the
practice of using the facilities of the duplication sec
tion for personal items.

One informant commented!
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He had several hundred copies made of a
flyer that was to be used by an organi
zation he belonged to.
Even if one assumed that "several hundred" meant 200,
the total cost of the particular type of copy would
have been $20.

The same informant noted that an as

sistant department head had an average of 50 copies
of personal material made per week, which would result
in a total cost of $260 per year.
Accounts concerning blue collar workers mentioned
various types of jobs including small welding jobs, the
machining of small parts, the fabrication of small items
such as signs, etc.
The most impressive record, by far, was registered
by executives at various levels.
the

An industrial plant

size of the one in question had the facilities for

accomplishing a wide variety of tasks, and it appears
that some employees took full advantage of those facil
ities.

One informant gave the following account*

One individual bought a 26 foot boat that
was in poor condition. As far as I can tell
most of the restoration was done right here
in the plant. He had the engine overhauled,
a number of parts machined, and a completely
new set of deck and cabin hardware made and
finished. The end product was a beautiful,
classic boat, but 1*11 bet the work cost the
company a fortune.
Naturally, records per se were not kept on the work,
but a careful search of the records of a few depart
ments did reveal the following*

1.

Total cost of material and labor for
hardware - $1,380

2.

Total cost of material and labor for
producing various machined parts - $895

Had it been possible to obtain figures on each opera
tion associated with the job, one could have easily
projected a total cost in excess of $4,000.
Continuing in the vein of restorations, one lower
level executive undertook the restoration of a classic
automobile.

Through various company contacts, he had

a solid walnut dashboard and door panels made and fin
ished by one company department.

Associated with these

parts, he had completely new fittings made, machined
and plated by the company.

An informant noted*

I know they must have spent three or four
days cleaning and plating a bunch of parts
like headlight casings, bumpers, wire wheels,
etc.
The cost of labor alone for one man working 8 hours per
day on plating would have been $102.

It was the opinion

of the informant in this case that two shifts per day
were spent on the work.
There were many other examples given for which it
was not possible to obtain cost figures.

One informant

noted that an executive had the complete plans for a
ten-room house done by an employee on company time.
Although it was impossible to determine how much time
was spent on the project, the average hourly rate of

6?

a designer at that time would have been between $5 and
$6 per hour.
One employee with a flair for completeness had a
fifteen foot boat and a trailer to transport it built
entirely in the plant.

The informant saidi

I don’t know how much time was charged to
it, but they worked on it off and on for
a couple of months.
It is important to note that no action was ever
taken against any of the individuals associated with
reported examples of the indulgency pattern.

Further,

intricate systems of security and material and labor
accountability instituted by Diversico have precluded
the repetition of the ”government job” syndrome on its
former scale.

The only examples uncovered pertaining

to the post-succession period were of individuals using
duplicating facilities to reproduce a few pages of per
sonal material.
Professionalization
Of the three professionalization variables selected
for the study, professional identification had perhaps
the weakest indicator, since linking one’s name to a
firm could be considered the course of least resistance
when dealing with laymen.

However, it should be noted

initially that professional identification is not charac
teristically high among engineers with bachelors degrees
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due to a relative lack of professional socialization,
(Perrucci and Gerstl, 1969s

79)

In addition it was

felt that the efficacy of the indicator could toe strength
ened toy supporting data from the remaining variables.

Professional Identification
The data for this variable are shown in Table 6.
It is important to note that all of the subjects gave
response A when asked the same question on the 1966
questionnaire.

After a six year period only 18.75

per cent of the respondents said they worked for
National, while 53»12 per cent said they were engineers
and 28.12 per cent noted a specific engineering field.

TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES ON PROFESSIONAL IDENTIFICATION

Responses
"I work for National"
"I'm an engineer"

Number
6
17

Gave the specific field of
engineering
32
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Graduate Degrees
In considering the possibility of a link between the
graduate degree variable and the influence of more ration
ally based corporate administration, it should be noted
that succession by Diversico took place in 1968.
Of the 32 respondents, ten (31*25 per cent) actually
held a Master's in engineering, were currently pursuing
the degree, or were planning to pursue the degree.

Those

who either held the degree or were pursuing it, began
their degree work after succession.

The number holding,

pursuing or contemplating the Blaster of Business Adminis
tration degree totaled four (12.5 per cent of the sample).
The one individual who held the MBA began his degree work
after succession, while two individuals currently doing
degree work began before succession.

The remainder of

the group or 18 individuals (56.25 per cent) had no plans
to seek graduate degrees of any kind.

Data obtained from

this aspect of the study are shown in Table 7*
With respect to the accepted credentials engineers,
there exists a certification which ranks in importance
with non-docioral degrees, and that is the Licensed Pro
fessional Engineer certificate.

Candidates for certifi

cation must pass a rigorous examination for which the
rate of failure is very high.

Two of the engineers pur

suing Master's degrees in engineering were also working
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toward this certification, while none of the MBA engineers
either held or were pursuing LPE certification.

TABLE 7
SUBJECTS HOLDING OR PURSUING GRADUATE DEGREES
Hold
Degree

Degree
Work Begun

Pursuing
Degree
Degree Work Begun

Master of
Science
Engineering

2

1969
1970

4

(1) 1970
(3) 1972

Master*s Business
Administra
tion

1

1969

2

196?
1968

Contemplating
Degree Work
Master of
Science
Engineering

4

Master*s Business
Administra
tion

1

Other

No
Plans

18

Professional Organization Membership
Data pertaining to the professional organization
membership of the respondents are shown in Table 8.

Of

those individuals who held the MS, were working on that

TABLE 8

SUMMARY OF RESPONDENTS* PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP

. . . . . . . . 1 II

II 1

1 11

11 III

Number of
Organizations

1

II 1

1

4

■

II

........

"

' '.

" "

2

... 3

1

1

2

1

4

None

Totals

Number of
Respondents
by Degree and
Graduate Work
MS
MS
In Process

1

2

Contemplating
MS

2

2

MBA

1

MBA
In Process

1

Contemplating
MBA

1

BS
No Plans

3

2

Totals

9

8

4
1

1

2
1

2
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1 1

13

18

13

32

degree, or were contemplating work on an MS, 70 per cent
were members of two or more professional organizations.
The individuals in the same classifications pertaining
to the MBA showed 25 per cent of two or more profession
al organizations.

Membership in two or more organiza

tions was held by 11.1 per cent of those who had no
plans to do advanced degree work.
The records of four professions! organizations were
examined to ascertain if there had been an increase in
membership by National engineers before and after suc
cession,

These data are shown in Table 9«

For the pur

pose of data presentation, the organizations are coded
A, B, C, and D.

It should also be noted that succession

occurred in late 1968.

Therefore, these data pertain

to the periods three years prior to, and after, January
1, 1969*

The percentage increase in membership of

National engineers was decidedly greater during the three
years following succession than during the previous three
years.

Accordingly the increase for all organizations

from 1966 to January 1969 was 12.83 per cent, while the
increase for the period January 1969 to January 1972
was 20.52 per cent.
Fealty to Contract
During interviews conducted to identify movement
from fealty to contract, subjects were asked to discuss
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the vestigial traces of the fealty syndrome identified
earlier in this study.

TABLE 9
MEMBERSHIP LEVEL OF NATIONAL ENGINEERS IN
SELECTED PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Organization

A

B

C

D

1966

337

165

218

449

196?

352

172

228

4?1

1968

365

177

240

489

1969

379

184

253

509

1970

397

196

270

535

1971

419

212

293

566

1972

441

233

321

601

12.46

11.51

16.05

13.36

16.62

26.63

26.87

18.07

Year

Increase in
Membership
Before
Succession (%)
3 years
Increase in
Membership
After
Succession (fo)
3 years

The first item noted was the practice of requiring
all staff and supervisory personnel to sign all rights
to inventions over to the company.

All of the subjects

were familiar with this practice and only two were not
aware that Diversico had altered this practice near the
end of their first year of Management.

According to the

new system inventors may sell and collect royalties on
their inventions, and the only reservation imposed by
the company is that it be allowed first option to bid
on the invention.

There was no way of immediately de

termining if this change in policy had stimulated in
vention and innovation among employees! however, one
assistant department head notedi
Under the old rule I knew of a couple of
cases where some guys had some good ideas
that could have been sold, but they didn't
bother because they knew that the company
would get all the benefit,
There was formerly an unwritten requirement that
executives above and including the division level join
the local country club.

Informants reported that much

of the upper level social life revolved around club
activities, and that many top level decisions were made
in that context.

One informant mentioned an attempt to

defy the requirement by an executive who was no longer
with the company.
About the only thing that was not brought
to bear on Andersen was physical force.
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Officials made constant references in
his presence to events which took place
at the club and asked him frequently if
he had applied for membership. He ulti
mately joined but left the company short
ly thereafter.
Attendant to the club membership was a biweekly ritual
of executive luncheon at the club.

On the appointed days

the company executives were transported to the club in
company limousines for a two-hour lunch at the company's
expense*

All of the informants noted that the membership

requirement and the biweekly luncheons had been discon
tinued during the first six months of Diversico* s manage
ment*

Over half of the informants voiced informed opin

ions that Diversico regarded the executive luncheons as
a needless frill.
Prior to succession, employees were permitted and
encouraged to leave their work sites for the purpose of
attending launchings.

Several informants commented that

management felt that such a practice instilled pride and
loyalty in employees,

One executive summed it up as

follows:
The whole display reminded me of what
my daughter describes as show and tell
in the grade school classroom.
Several informants mentioned that they did not remember
missing a single launching during the pre-succession
period.

When asked to comment regarding the present

status of this practice all of the informants noted
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essentially that launchings had taken on a new complex
ion.

The expected ritual associated with such events

remains in evidence% however, the audience is notice
ably smaller,

Most informants underscored the comment

of one of their number who said*
About the only people you see from the
company are the president and a few high
officials, Naturally, there are people
behind the scenes who are essential to
the launching and handle all the gear re
quired to launch a ship. The usual invited
dignitaries are also present, and more often
than not there are some members of the gene
ral public.
Another informant noted:
I doubt that the new management sees any
advantage to having several thousand
people off the job for a launching.
The former reports of punishment associated with a
refusal to work overtime were discussed in the section on
overtime rules.

It has been established that such pun

ishments existed, and it is contended that this type of
practice is characteristic of fealty-based systems.

In

formants said without exception that they had no know
ledge of such punishments taking place during the post
succession period.
The accounts rendered in the literature of fealtybased practices would indicate that there is little room
for nonconformity under such systems.

Comments made by

informants pointed to the fact that there were a few
reactions to nonconforming behavior during Nationals
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pre-succession period.
by most informants.

Notably, two cases were cited

The first involved an engineer-

executive whose ability was highly regarded and was
undoubtedly an expert in his field.

One informant com

mented*
People called him from all ofer the
country to get answers on _______
It appeared that this individual had what were regarded as
behavioral quirks.

Regardless of the time of year he wore

a suit with a vest, carried an umbrella and wore a fur
hat.

Further, he would be seen on rainy mornings approach

ing the plant with the top down on his sports car and his
umbrella held over his head.
Reacting to a question regarding top management's
view of this behavior several highly placed executives
noted that he was characterized as a crackpot.

Further,

he had little patience with regulation and communications
channels which he considered to be a waste of time.
George thought that the item of highest
priority was to get the job done or the
i- problem solved, and he was damned good
at it.
This comment was made by one informant and in essence by
several others.

The individual in question was ultimate

ly dismissed for bypassing a regular channel of communi
cation after which he accepted an influential position
with a larger firm.
The second case which was most frequently mentioned

involved another engineer who was also regarded as an
expert in his field.

It appears that this individual

refused to wear a shirt and tie to the office.

During

cold weather he often wore what were discribed as
"baggy turtleneck sweaters," and in warm weather he
wore sports shirts.

The accounts of informants indi

cated that a great deal of executive pressure was
brought to bear upon the engineer.

One noted*

I know of at least two occasions when he
was asked to come up to the senior vicepresident* s office about his dress. He
even went to staff meetings in that baggy
turtleneck sweater.
The engineer in question was also dismissed, and three
informants mentioned that he immediately entered gradu
ate school, obtained his doctorate and is presently
teaching at the college level.
While making post-succession observations, it was
possible to see engineers and office types who espoused
various modes of dress.

Approximately half of the en

gineers observed did not wear ties, and long hair was
commonplace from the level of the laborer to executive
row.

An informal conversation with five engineers re

sulted in the following statement*
They seem to be a lot more interested in
what you can do rather than how you dress
and who you know.
The four remaining engineers agreed with the opinion of
the first informant who also noted*
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In a way the company was like a big
family. That atmosphere is gone.
This place is strictly business.
The foregoing statements raised an interesting
point in the form of an employment practice which exist
ed under the previous management.

During the post-suc

cession period National had its equivalent of the "speak
ing for” system which has been common in England during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

This system

involved attempts to secure employment for relatives
and friends by "putting in a good word" on their behalf
with one *s supervisor.

Consequently, it was possible to

observe cases where the entire male contigent of a fami
ly was employed in the same department.

Department heads

and assistant department heads, who are closes to this
kind of situation observed that the practice is all but
defunct®

The "good word" has been replaced by an apti

tude test which does not exclude family members if they
possess the qualifications to do the job in question.
One department with which the investigator was fami
liar formerly had supervisors who showed a good deal of
favoritism concerning job assignments.

As with many

occupations this one had assignments which were charac
terized by minimum hazards and the ability to easily
achieve high production.

Informal conversations with

members of this department revealed that this practice
had also been changed.

One informant commented:
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Old
and _______ don't pull that
crap no more. Now everybody gets a crack
at the gravy jobs.
The investigator witnessed the shift assignments made
*>y one of the supervisors in question on four consecu
tive days, and the "gravy jobs" were indeed assigned on
a rotating basis.
Several informants noted a pre-succession practice
of grooming favored subordinates for executive positions
on the basis of personality rather than ability.

These

informants also said that for all practical purposes
this practice has been eliminated.

Diversico has insti

tuted a system of employee evaluation based on perforance criteria, and this system includes engineering as
well as production personnel.

Evaluations are made by

supervisory personnel and submitted by-annually for
review.

Observations
A few casual conversations which were not associat
ed with specific categories of interviews revealed that
Diversico had greatly increased the employment benefits
applicable to all categories of personnel.

Employees

were formerly required to pay a portion of their group
insurance premiums.

These premiums are presently ab

sorbed by the company, and the amount of coverage has
been increased.

In addition, the vacation and sick
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time benefits have been expanded and all employees are
permitted to invest in Diversico stock programs.
During the pre-succession period, the investigator
had noted the paternalistic practice of placing super
visors who had been phased out of other departments in
charge of sections of women employees such as typing
pools and the duplicating section.

Observations made

during this study indicate that such sections are now
supervised by women.
There appeared to be several general changes in
the tenor of the plant.

At any single time prior to

succession it was possible to observe hundreds of em
ployees moving about the yard or standing in small
groups.
area.

This was particularly true in the waterfront
During post-succession observations, these indi

viduals were indeed conspicuous by their absence.

Sev

eral mid-morning trips to the waterfront were charac
terized by the almost complete absence of people moving
about.

There were, of course, the exceptions of some

workers driving various vehicles and others carrying
equipment from shop to ship, but the groups of workers
milling about were gone.
The general appearance of the plant had also
changed.

Whereas there was formerly equipment lying

about the shops and yard, all equipment which was not
in use was now covered and stored.

The overall appear

82
ance was as crisp and clean as one could expect from
that type of business site.

The bull-sessions over

idle equipment were also gone.

As one approached a

group of workers all that could be heard were the
sounds of their chippers, welding units, or grinders
which seemed to merge into one great hum as one stood
in the yard away from the fabrication shops.

Further,

the hum did not die twenty minutes before lunch time,
but only in conjunction with the lunch whistle.

Workers

left for lunch en masse and returned the same way.
Promptly at the end of lunch hour, the hum began and
did not die again until the end of the shift.

Former

caches of candy bars, crackers, and soft drinks had
also disappeared.

One elderly black messenger who

made additional income by supplying workers with
candy bars, sandwiches, etc. during working hours was
completely out of business.

He saids

I jes canft get out of the yard like
I usta.
In short, the plant now had the sound and appearance
of a well-oiled machine.

Everything and everyone had a

function, and at least from outward appearances, was
accomplishing that function.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

The information obtained during the course of this
study would indicate that a change from nonrational to
rational corporate administration is indeed associated
with movement from fealty to contract as posited by Vanfossen and Berkley.

This change in administrative tac

tics can also be seen as movement toward Weber9s model
of bureaucracy.

The obvious emphasis on achieving or

ganizational goals, the manifest interest in an employees
technical qualifications, and the stress on equitable
treatment of employees all point toward a congruence
with Weber's model.
As regards articulation with the review of the
literature pertaining to the association between ration
ality and bureaucracy, the findings of this study do not
indicate that the two are always positively associated.
Rather, the findings show that corporate bureaucracies
may employ varying degrees of rational administrative
practices, and while a corporate entity may be large
enough to be considered highly bureaucratized, it is not
necessarily rational in its administration.

Concurrently,

the findings do show that a corporate bureaucracy can
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unquestionably move toward a ideal-typical stance visa-vis rational behavior.

The findings also show, at

least tentatively, that the use of rational practices
serve the function of organizational goals.
Another important fact emerging from this study is
the value of using firms acquired by conglomerates as
a milieu for examining the phenomenon of a movement
from fealty to contract.

The range of observations

which were possible while using only one investigator
speak quite clearly to this point.

It is recommended

that future investigators attempt to study the firm
thoroughly prior to succession.

This procedure would

obviate the necessity to rely solely on the memory of
informants regarding pre-succession events.

Despite

this shortcoming a conglomerate merger situation offers
an almost test tube case in which to study the actionreaction of an attempt to achieve organizational goals.
A stated objective of the study was an attempt to
identify the existence of nonrational practices prior
to succession, with a view toward examining their effect
on the organization, and their status following succession.
The evidence associated with specific dimensions of ana
lysis, albeit insufficient to show causation in a rigor
ous scientific sense, indicates the pre-succession exist
ence of practices which could not have contributed to the
goal of profit-making.
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As regards specific dimensions of analysis, the
shifts in emphasis pertaining to the policy question
have undoubtedly contributed to the favorable profit
picture reported by National.

The company's partici

pation in a number of new markets and the ongoing in
vestigation of additional markets coupled with the
adoption of cost-saving techniques and the use of per
sonnel with proven competence have also been important
to the viability of the firm.

This viability is under

scored by the fact that the work force has increased by
5,000 persons in the past year.

Further, the company

is presently engaged in a multi-million dollar expan
sion program.

Personnel changes made during this study

are designed to draw upon the strongest abilities of
the individuals involved.

The appointment of Diversico*s

first president to the position of chairman of the board
will free more of his time for long range planning at
which he has a recognized capability.

His replacement

has a strong record in the areas of coordination and
operations, and in his new position will be responsible
for the day-to-day operations of the plant.
The data obtained regarding the imposition and en
forcement of rules indicate that Diversico believed that
such rules were necessary to the achievement of organi
zational goals.

Of those rules probed by this study,

the company's management had effected changes which un
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doubtedly resulted in a considerable savings to the com
pany in both labor and material.

Further, the investi

gator detected no overt hostility associated with rule
enforcement which tends to support Gouldner and Grusky*s
thesis that large firms are less liable to be disrupted
by managerial succession than small firms.
It was posited earlier that a movement from fealty
to contract, or the replacement of relations based on
personality by those of a contractual nature, might con
tribute to a tendency toward professionalization.

Both

Vanfossen and Berkley cite professionalization as a
phenomenon associated with the shift from fealty to con
tract, and the data from this study point to a trend
toward professionalization on the part of National en
gineers.

The informants not only identified themselves

as engineers, but more than twice as many of their num
ber were associated with graduate work in business,

In

addition, their membership In all organizations combined,
registered a growth of 20.52 per cent in the post-succes
sion period as opposed to 12.83 per cent in the pre-suc
cession period.

These data, although inconclusive, do

Indicate a trend toward professionalization according to
accepted indicators.
In the realm of more traditional fealty-based prac
tices, the data show those vestigial examples noted for
the pre-succession period have completely disappeared
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under conglomerate management.

Observations made inde

pendently of interviews also support the notion of a
move from nonrational to rational practices.
The results of this study suggest that a change
from nonrational to rational administration is associated
with a movement from fealty to contract, and as such,de
notes a move toward congruence with Weber's classic model.
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RESEARCH NOTES

I feel I must say a word about the subject of con
ducting a case study incognito for the benefit of those
individuals who may contemplate undertaking such a study.
Not all investigators will react in the same way toward
assuming the dual role of participant and observer? how
ever, I am compelled to admit that the element of adven
ture added a certain zest to the entire project.

Perhaps

this kind of a feeling applies only to frustrated James
Bond types such as myself.
In the way of a word of serious caution, I would
advise the prospective investigator to thoroughly re
search the role he plans to assume, as well as the sur
roundings in which he plans to operate.

Even with a

familiarity born of many years experience with the com
pany, a period of acclimation was necessary.

Memory is

not always as reliable a crutch as one might think, and
the fresher the memory, the better the chances of suc
cess.

Gaining the ability to move about freely in order

to cover as much ground as possible per hour of observa
tion time requires near total familiarity with the re
search setting and the ability to give plausible answers
to a myriad of questions.

Encounter after encounter
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with employees repeatedly underscored the fact that a
lesser familiarity with the plant, the routine, and the
roles would have spelled certain failure.
The foregoing notwithstanding, if the prospective
investigator is willing to do his homework, I heartily
recommend this type of investigation as a total test of
one*s faculties.
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